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TEXTUALISM AND THE INDIAN CANONS OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Alex Tallchief Skibine*

ABSTRACT
When interpreting statutes enacted for the benefit or regulation of Indians or
construing treaties signed with Indian nations, courts are supposed to apply any of five
specific canons of construction relating to Indian Affairs. Through examining the
modern line of Supreme Court cases involving statutory or treaty interpretation relating
to Indian nations, this Article demonstrates that the Court has generally been faithful in
applying canons relating to treaty interpretation or abrogation. The Court has also
respected the canon requiring unequivocal expression of congressional intent before
finding an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. However, there are two other
canons that the Court almost never applies. One, the tribal sovereignty canon, requires
clear intent to interfere with tribal sovereign rights; the other, the Indian ambiguity
canon, requires statutes to be construed liberally with ambiguities resolved to the benefit
of Indians. After reviewing the possible reasons why textualist jurists might be opposed
to the use of substantive canons, this Article makes two arguments to remedy any
reluctance to using the tribal sovereignty and Indian ambiguity canons. First, these
canons have constitutional roots, and as such, even textualists on the Court should not
be reluctant to use them. Second, the more established canon concerning abrogation of
tribal sovereign immunity should also extend to statutes interfering with tribal
sovereign rights. There are no normative reasons to treat abrogation of sovereign
immunity differently than other statutory interference with tribal sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION
When interpreting treaties signed between the United States and
Indian nations or statutes enacted for the regulation or benefit of
Indians and Indian nations, 1 courts are supposed to apply the Indian
canons of treaty and statutory construction. 2 There are arguably five
such canons, which this Article will refer to as the canons of treaty
interpretation, treaty abrogation, tribal sovereign immunity, tribal
sovereignty, and Indian ambiguity. First, there is the treaty
interpretation canon: when a court interprets an Indian treaty, the
treaty “must be interpreted in light of the parties’ intentions, with any
ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians . . . and the words of a
treaty must be construed in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.” 3 The second canon can be described as the
treaty abrogation canon: when the issue is whether a subsequent Act of
Congress abrogated or modified an Indian treaty, the test is whether
there is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the treaty right
and decided to abrogate that right. 4 This canon could be considered a

1. This Article uses the term Indian nations and Indian tribes interchangeably. Same for the
terms Indians, Native Americans, or American Indians. There is no legal significance associated
with these different terms.
2. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1140–56 (1990).
3. See Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct 1686, 1699 (2019) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
4. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986) (“[W]here the evidence of
congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently compelling, ‘the weight of authority indicates that
such an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the
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quasi-clear statement rule. Clear statement rules require specific
language announcing congressional intent to interfere with a valued
norm, such as abrogating the sovereign immunity of the states. 5 I
describe the treaty abrogation rule as “quasi” because the search for
“actual consideration” can be derived not only from the text of the
statute but also from its legislative history, as was the case in United
States v. Dion. 6
Third, there is what this Article refers to as the tribal sovereign
immunity canon, since it has basically been used by the Court only for
congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. 7 That
test was first applied in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, where the Court
stated: “without congressional authorization, the Indian Nations are
exempt from suit. It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity
‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” 8 When it
comes to interfering with tribal self-government outside of abrogating
sovereign immunity, such as allowing suit against tribal officials, the
Santa Clara Court phrased the test differently, refusing to allow such
suits “unless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the
additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such
actions in a federal forum would represent.” 9 So, the abrogation of
sovereign immunity requires “unequivocal expression of congressional
intent” while the abrogation of tribal sovereignty requires only “clear”
indication of congressional intent. This Article will refer to this latter
canon as the tribal sovereignty canon.
Finally, there is what can be called the Indian ambiguity canon,
applicable to all statutes enacted for the benefit or regulation of
Indians. 10 As the Court put it, “[w]hen we are faced with two possible
constructions, our choice between them must be dictated by a principle
deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions

legislative history of a statute.’ What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other and
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”).
5. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). On clear statement rules, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 636–40 (1992).
6. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 740–44 (examining in detail the legislative history of the Eagle
Protection Act in holding that Congress had actually considered the treaty hunting rights of
Indians and decided to abrogate them).
7. For the evolution of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, see William Wood, It Wasn’t
an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587 (2013).
8. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
9. Id. at 72.
10. See Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 269 (1992).
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interpreted to their benefit.’” 11 Note that this last canon has two
components: first, that the statute must be “liberally construed,” 12 and
second, that ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted for the benefit
of the Indians.
While the Court is inclined to apply the first two treaty-related
cannons, 13 as well as the tribal sovereign immunity canon, 14 it has rarely
applied, or even discussed, the canons of tribal sovereignty and Indian
ambiguity. Thus, in the last thirty-five years (since 1987), the Court has
decided at least twenty-six cases involving Federal Indian law where the
holding depended exclusively on statutory or treaty interpretation. 15
Yet, in that time period, only four cases discussed the Indian ambiguity
canon, and only one invoked it in its holding. 16 Professor Matthew
Fletcher recently spoke on this state of affairs:
The reality is that when it comes to interpreting Indian affairs
statutes, the judiciary too often treats these canons as
voluntary. And if a court relies on these canons, they often do so
in support of an outcome favoring tribal interests reached on
other grounds, sort of like frosting on top. 17
This Article analyzes some of these twenty-six Supreme Court cases
to understand the reasons for the Court’s reluctance to invoke the
Indian ambiguity canon, including the interconnection between the
canon and textualism—the ascendant interpretive methodology.18
11. Id.
12. The term “liberally construed” should be understood to mean that the statute should be
interpreted broadly to fully effectuate its purpose.
13. Although, as noted by Professor Richard Collins, this is not always the case. See Richard
Collins, Never Construed to Their Prejudice: In Honor of David Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has ignored the canon in recent rulings . . . .”); see also South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
14. As the Court recently stated: “The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal
immunity; and ‘[t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that
purpose.’” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014) (quoting C & L Enters., Inc.
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)) (alterations in original).
15. See Alexander T. Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last Thirty Years of Federal Indian Law: Looking
for Equilibrium or Supremacy, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277 (2018). Not taken into account are cases
involving the Indian preemption doctrine discussing whether federal law has preempted state
jurisdiction in Indian Country or the cases involving divestment of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. These cases are not included because they were not decided exclusively on statutory
grounds, although statutory and treaty construction was, obviously, a factor. See Collins, supra
note 13, at 50–55; see also Frickey, supra note 2, at 1160–66.
16. The cases are Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251 (1992), Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993), Chickasaw Nation v. United States,
534 U.S. 84 (2001), and Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
17. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 MICH. J. RACE & L. 111, 138 (2020).
18. For the ascendancy of textualism, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990). For textualist methodology, see John F. Manning, Second Generation
Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010).
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There is no question that one of the reasons for the Court’s failure to
invoke the Indian ambiguity canon is that it can be easily avoided by
finding no ambiguity in the statute. 19 Thus, it may be that judges who
are faithful to textualism, which focuses on the statutory text and the
plain meaning of the words, are less likely to find ambiguities in
statutes. 20
Some scholars have correctly noted that there is no current test for
determining whether an ambiguity exists. 21 The problem created by this
lack of agreement on what constitutes an ambiguity could have been
partially attenuated if the courts had more scrupulously applied the
“liberally construed” requirement or the tribal sovereignty canon. But
the Court basically ignores these two rules of construction. This Article
argues that although there may be a pragmatic reason for treating
sovereign immunity differently than other interferences with tribal
sovereignty, in that “sovereign immunity” is a discrete and well-defined
area while tribal sovereignty is not, there are no normative reasons for
doing so. In other words, congressional intent to interfere with tribal
sovereignty should also be, in the words of the Santa Clara Court,
“unequivocally expressed.” The difference between “clear indication”
and “unequivocal expression” may sound like a matter of semantics, but
the fact remains that the tribal sovereign immunity canon is being
applied while the tribal sovereignty canon is not. 22 If there is a
difference, it may be that “unequivocal expression” of congressional
intent has more of a textualist bent than “clear indication”—
theoretically, looking for “unequivocal expression” will make judges
focus on the text of the statute, and not on extratextual material, to find

19. See discussion infra Subsection I.B.3.
20. Justice Scalia, when speaking of another doctrine that also requires a finding of
ambiguity before application, reflected:
How clear is clear? . . . In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the
degree to which a person is (for want of a better word) a “strict constructionist” of
statutes, and the degree to which that person favors Chevron. . . . The reason is obvious.
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text
and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering
requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will
require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not
personally adopt.
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21. In
the same article, Scalia continued: “Contrariwise, one who abhors a ‘plain meaning’ rule, and is
willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will
more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of
‘reasonable’ interpretation.” Id. at 521.
21. See Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis,
and the Central Role of Ambiguity in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 794–95, 799–800
(2010).
22. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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such clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate tribal
sovereign rights.
Part I begins by explaining why the Indian canons are normative
canons that should be applied in the interpretation of statutes enacted
for the benefit or regulation of Indians. Next, this Article surveys
Supreme Court cases decided on statutory or treaty interpretation
grounds since 1987. After arguing that the reservation disestablishment
cases should be considered treaty abrogation cases, this Part concludes
by identifying some of the cases that should have been decided
differently had the Court applied the Indian ambiguity canon.
In Part II, this Article delves into the textualist perspective on
applying substantive canons. This theme was more recently taken up by
Justice Kavanaugh in an article written before he joined the Court.23
Justice Kavanaugh argued that judges should, as much as possible, shy
away from making determinations that statutes are ambiguous because
a finding of ambiguity allows judges to “resort to a variety of canons of
construction,” which Kavanaugh finds troubling. 24 Coincidentally, the
idea that textualist judges should be reluctant to use “substantive” or
“normative” canons was also considered by another future Supreme
Court Justice, Amy Coney Barrett. In a 2010 article, she explained that
textualist judges are reluctant to use these substantive canons because
they conflict with the role of judges as “faithful agents” of the legislature
by reflecting extratextual norms which the drafters of the legislation
were not likely considering. 25 This Article explains why, when it comes
to the Indian canons, such reluctance is misplaced. I argue that the
Indian canons have constitutional roots, and that their legitimacy is
similar to that of federalist canons. 26
Finally, I present an argument that the test applicable to abrogation
of tribal sovereign immunity should be applicable to any statute
abrogating tribal sovereign rights. This Article concludes by discussing
the limits of the Indian canons’ applicability.

23. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
24. Id. at 2134–35.
25. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110
(2010).
26. In a noted article, Professors Eskridge and Frickey identified five such federalist canons: “1.
Rule Against Federal Conditions on State Administration of Federal/State Programs with Federal
Funding,” “2. Super-Strong Rule Against Congressional Waiver of States’ Eleventh Amendment
Immunity from Suit in Federal Court,” “3. Super-Strong Rule Against Congressional Regulation of
Core State Functions,” “4. Presumption Against Statutory Regulation of Intergovernmental Taxation,”
and “5. Presumption Against Applicability of Federal Statutes to State and Local Political Processes.”
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 619–28.
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I. THE INDIAN CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Background Principles and Normative Reasons for the Indian Canons
Whether one is a textualist looking for the meaning of a text or
a purposivist/intentionalist looking for the purpose or intent behind
Congress’s words, 27 courts use canons of statutory construction to
resolve ambiguities in statutory text. 28 Substantive or normative canons
create background norms to help the interpreter decide the meaning
that the words of a statute should be given. 29 As Professor Frickey
noted, normative canons “go outside the document and create an
exception to the basic interpretive approach for cases that implicate
certain important values. In most instances, these policy-based canons
operate either as tiebreakers at the end of the basic interpretive analysis
or as rebuttable presumptions at the outset of the interpretive
process.”30
The first Indian canons were developed in connection with
interpreting treaties between the United States and Indian nations.31
According to Professor Frickey, Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia
grounded the Court’s interpretation of the treaty with the Cherokees in
the value of structural sovereignty, viewing the Cherokee treaties as
organic documents integrating Cherokee Nation into the United States
as domestic but still sovereign nations. 32 The major issue in Worcester
was the validity of Georgia’s claim that it could assert jurisdiction over
Cherokee territory given that the Cherokee Nation had, in treaties with
the United States, ceded all of its sovereignty. 33 The Court refused to
allow Georgia jurisdiction, holding that the Cherokee Nation was still a

27. As stated by now-Justice Coney Barrett: “Purposivism, the classical approach to statutory
interpretation, claims that a judge should be faithful to Congress’s presumed intent rather than to
the statutory text when the two appear to diverge. Textualism, by contrast, maintains that the
statutory text is the only reliable indication of congressional intent.” Coney Barrett, supra note 25, at
112. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualist from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70
(2006).
28. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 11–14 (2016).
29. Id. at 14–17.
30. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 414 (1993).
31. The first canons of Indian treaty interpretations were developed in Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
32. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 408–11.
33. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 553–56 (“This treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national
character of the Cherokees and their right of self-government, thus guarantying their lands,
assuming the duty of protection, and of course pledging the faith of the United States for that
protection, has been frequently renewed, and is now in full force.”).
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sovereign Indian Nation. 34 From that original case, the Court eventually
adopted the rule that treaty terms had to be construed the way the
Indians would have naturally understood them at the time of the
signing. 35 As recently stated by the Court, Indian treaties “must be
interpreted in light of the parties’ intentions, with any ambiguities
resolved in favor of the Indians, and the words of a treaty must be
construed in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by
the Indians.” 36
Although Worcester involved the interpretation of a treaty, the Court
in Choate v. Trapp extended Worcester’s reasoning to the interpretation of
statutes enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians. 37 The issue in
Choate—whether the State of Oklahoma could tax Indian lands—
required resolving ambiguity that derived from two apparently
conflicting statutes. 38 Acknowledging the “general rule that tax
exemptions are to be strictly construed,” the Court nevertheless ruled in
favor of the Indians because
in the Government’s dealings with the Indians the rule is
exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict, is
liberal; doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor
of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and
defenseless people, who are wards of the nation. 39
The Choate Court claimed that “[t]his rule of construction has been
recognized, without exception, for more than a hundred years,”
although it did not provide any citations for this claim. 40 While Choate
and other early cases relied on similarly outdated “weak and
defenseless” wording to justify the canon, the Court eventually used the
same kind of reasoning initially applied to treaty abrogation to make

34. Id. at 561 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force
. . . .”).
35. The first mention that ambiguous provisions should be construed in favor of the Indians
was articulated by Justice McLean in Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 582 (McLean, J., concurring) (“The
language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice.”).
36. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1699 (2019).
37. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 674–75 (1912).
38. See id. at 667–72. The first statute at issue was the Curtis Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 505, which
allotted the reservation but imposed many restrictions on the sale of such allotments. The second
statute was the Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312, which removed many of these restrictions
and which the state argued made the land taxable.
39. Choate, 224 U.S. at 674–75; see also Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89
(1918).
40. Choate, 224 U.S. at 675.
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sure that statutes did not unintentionally abrogate tribal rights in nontreaty interpretation contexts. 41
In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, which concerned whether the
State could tax tribal royalties from oil and gas leases under the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, the State invoked the presumption against
implied repeals to argue that its taxation power remained intact. 42 The
Court disagreed, finding:
The State fails to appreciate, however, that the standard
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual
force in cases involving Indian law. As we said earlier this
Term, “[t]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law are
rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United
States and the Indians.” 43
A few years later, in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Court followed the Blackfeet canon,
finding: “When we are faced with two possible constructions, our
choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in
this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted
to their benefit.’” 44
In an article written before she joined the Supreme Court, Justice
Coney Barrett mentioned that although the Indian ambiguity canon
started with interpreting Indian treaties, it migrated to interpreting
statutes without any real explanation. 45 She noted that only one lower
court at the time had stated that the treaty rule became applicable to
statutes because Congress stopped making treaties with Indian tribes
and instead started regulating them through statutes. 46 Although she
cited to Professor Frickey’s scholarship in this area, Justice Coney
Barrett attributed the origin of the Indian ambiguity canon of treaty
interpretation to contract law principles under which the benefit of the
doubt is given to the less sophisticated party. 47 In effect, Professor
Frickey reached the opposite conclusion, stating that “[a] theory of

41. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 416–17; see also Collins, supra note 13, at 21–25; Scott C. Hall,
The Indian Canons of Construction v. the Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous
Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN L. REV. 495, 538–43 (2004).
42. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); 25 U.S.C §§ 396a–396g.
43. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766 (quoting Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.,
470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985)). On the trust relationship, see infra Section II.B.
44. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.
251, 269 (1992) (alteration in original).
45. Coney Barrett, supra note 25, at 151–52.
46. Id. (citing Conway v. United States, 149 F. 261, 265–66 (C.C.D. Neb. 1907)).
47. Cnty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 152.
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sovereignty, then, rather than contract, better explains Chief Justice
Marshall’s interpretation in Worcester.”48 Although sovereignty may
better explain Marshall’s theory, contract interpretation theory can also
provide theoretical justifications for the Indian ambiguity canon. 49
This Article endorses Professor Frickey’s argument that Marshall’s
treaty interpretation methodology was similar to constitutional
interpretation because Chief Justice Marshall considered the treaties as
documents incorporating Indian tribes into the U.S. political system. 50
The objection could be raised, however, that while treaties are
documents of incorporation, statutes are not, so the rules of
interpretation applying to treaties should not apply to Indian statutes.
Yet, as Justice O’Connor noted:
“rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United
States and the Indians,” the Indian canon presumes
congressional intent to assist its wards to overcome the
disadvantages our country has placed upon them. Consistent
with this purpose, the Indian canon applies to statutes as well
as treaties: The form of the enactment does not change the
presumption. 51
The Indian ambiguity canon of statutory construction can be
considered a normative canon because it is “rooted in the unique trust
relationship between the United States and the Indians.” 52 This canon
recognizes that the trust relationship constitutes a background norm
that should be respected when interpreting statutes enacted pursuant
to Congress’s role as trustee for the tribes. Most scholars agree that the
first official indication of the existence of a trust relationship with
Indian nations was Chief Justice Marshall’s famous description of the
federal-tribal relationship in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia as being akin to
that of a guardian to its ward. 53
Thus, if the purpose of using a canon is to determine what Congress
meant when it used particular words or phrasing in a statute, the
Indian ambiguity canon fulfills this function by presuming that when
Congress enacts statutes for the benefit of Indians, it acts pursuant to
the trust relationship and would not want a statute to be construed to
the detriment of Indian tribes. In that manner, applying the Indian
48. Frickey, supra note 30, at 407.
49. See Collins, supra note 13, at 5–9.
50. Id. at 408–11. For an argument that interpreting treaties the way Indians would have
understood them at the time of the signing conforms to originalist theories of constitutional
interpretation, see Jacob Schuman, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1115–19 (2013).
51. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 99–100 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2(1831).
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ambiguity canon is necessary to the Court’s role as a “faithful agent” of
Congress. 54 Thus, when Congress is acting pursuant to the trust
relationship in enacting Indian-related legislation, it would naturally
expect the statute to be interpreted to the benefit of the Indians.
Scholars have proposed other arguments concerning the
normativity of the Indian canons. Professor Richard Collins, for
instance, justified the Indian statutory canons on a theory of
democratic deficit, arguing:
Democratic deficit is a strong reason for courts to insist that
Congress spell out legislative impairments of Indian
rights . . . during most of our history, Congress acted with
virtually no Indian influence and often in response to Indians’
powerful enemies. Thus, when courts interpret statutes
adopted under those conditions, the democratic deficit ought
to support a strong statutory canon. 55
Professor David Williams, on the other hand, tied statutory
interpretation in Indian cases to the fact that Indian tribes never
consented to come under the plenary power of Congress, stating “[e]ven
if the courts accept congressional power as a brute fact imposed on
them by the Constitution or institutional necessity, they must still seek
a reason justifying that power in order to provide themselves with a
lodestar to guide interpretation.” 56 Although many scholars view the
trust doctrine as beneficial to Indian nations, 57 it has had a complicated
and mixed history. Although the doctrine can be a source of protection
and duties owed by the United States to Indian nations, it was also, at
some point in time, viewed as a source of federal power allowing the
United States to exercise plenary governmental control over Indian
tribes. 58

54. On courts being the faithful agents of Congress, see generally Coney Barrett, supra note
25, at 112 (“The view that federal courts function as the faithful agents of Congress is a conventional
one. Throughout most of the twentieth century, participants in debates about statutory
interpretation largely subscribed to it; the disputes centered around how best to implement it. The
rival theories in this regard were—and remain—purposivism and textualism.”).
55. See Collins, supra note 13, at 25–26.
56. See David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and
Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 415 (1994).
57. See, e.g., Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with SelfDetermination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility in the TwentyFirst Century (Rocky Mountain Min. L. Found., Working Paper No. 13A, 2005).
58. Thus, in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), the Court held that the United States
could assert criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed among tribal members and famously
declared “[t]he power of the [g]eneral [g]overnment over these remnants of a race once powerful
. . . is necessary to their protection. . . . It must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
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As explained in Part II, this Article takes the position that the
Indian canons of construction are constitutionally based because the
trust relationship has constitutional roots.
B. The Court’s Modern Treaty and Statutory Interpretation Cases
1. The Treaty Cases
There are two types of treaty cases: treaty interpretation cases and
treaty abrogation cases. 59 Treaty abrogation cases are controlled by the
test enunciated in United States v. Dion. 60 The issue in Dion was whether
an Act of Congress, the Eagle Protection Act, abrogated the treaty
hunting rights of a Sioux tribe on its reservation. 61 In holding that the
treaty right was abrogated, the Court articulated a test requiring clear
evidence that Congress actually considered the treaty right in question
and opted to abrogate or modify it. 62 In Dion, such clear evidence was
“strongly suggested on the face of the Eagle Protection Act” since there
was a provision allowing Indians to take eagles for religious purposes
pursuant to a federally issued permit. 63 Although the Court relied on
legislative history only to support its textual interpretation, it
unfortunately prefaced its clear evidence of congressional
consideration test by announcing in dicta that “where the evidence of
congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently compelling, the weight
of authority indicates that such an intent can also be found by a
reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the legislative
history of a statute.” 64
Tribal interests won four treaty cases decided in the last thirty
years, all in 5-4 decisions. 65 The tribal position lost one case, South
Dakota v. Bourland, a treaty abrogation case involving a tribal attempt to
control non-members hunting and fishing within the exterior

United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.” Id. at 384–85.
59. Treaty abrogation cases involve interpreting whether subsequent Acts of Congress
modified or terminated a treaty right. Treaty interpretation cases involve interpreting the words of
a treaty.
60. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
61. Id. at 734–36.
62. Id. at 738–40. There must be “clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.” Id. at 740.
63. Id. at 740.
64. Id. at 734, 739.
65. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Herrera v. Wyoming, 139
S. Ct 1686 (2019); Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019); Idaho v.
United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001).
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boundaries of the reservation. 66 The issue in Bourland was whether the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe preserved its treaty right to exclude nonmembers on land that was within the reservation but taken by the
federal government for a dam and reservoir project. 67 In an opinion
authored by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the Tribe’s treaty right
to exclude non-members from the reservation, implicit in its rights of
“absolute and undisturbed use and occupation” of such lands, as well as
its derivative right to regulate non-members while on these lands, was
implicitly abrogated when the United States took the lands from the
Tribe, assumed control over such lands, and opened them for general
public use. 68
Justice Thomas insisted that his analysis was not in conflict with
Dion. 69 Thomas concluded, however, that he could only explain the
relevant provisions of the Cheyenne River Act and the Flood Control Act
as “indications that Congress sought to divest the Tribe of its right to
‘absolute use and occupation.’” 70 That conclusion was strongly objected
to by the dissent, which stated that the majority “points not even to a
scrap of evidence that Congress actually considered the possibility that
by taking the land in question it would deprive the Tribe of its authority
to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on that land.” 71 The dissent
also remarked that although the Court acknowledged the application of
cases like Dion to the instant case, “the majority adopts precisely the
sort of reasoning-by-implication that those cases reject.” 72
In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, one important issue was
whether certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights, guaranteed to
the Chippewas in an 1837 treaty, were terminated by an 1850 Executive
Order, by a subsequent treaty signed with the Tribe in 1855, or by
Minnesota entering the Union in 1858. 73 The Court ruled that none of
these actions abrogated or terminated the Tribe’s treaty rights. 74 The
Court followed Dion and held there was no “clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action

66. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 681–82, 693-94 (1993).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 690.
69. Id. at 693–94.
70. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 693. The Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.), authorized the establishment of a
comprehensive flood control plan along the Missouri River. In the 1954 Cheyenne River Act, Pub. L.
No. 83-776, 68 Stat. 1191, the Tribe ceded 104,420 acres of former trust land to the United States for
implementation of a flood control project authorized under the Flood Control Act.
71. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 700 (Blackmun, J. & Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172, 175–76 (1999).
74. Id. at 176 (“After an examination of the historical record, we conclude that the Chippewa
retain the usufructuary rights guaranteed to them under the 1837 Treaty.”).
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on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.” 75
Herrera v. Wyoming was both a treaty abrogation and a treaty
interpretation case. 76 Concerning treaty abrogation, the major issue
was whether Congress intended to end the Crow Tribe’s hunting rights,
guaranteed in a 1868 Treaty, by enacting the Wyoming Statehood Act.77
The treaty had a clause authorizing tribal members to continue hunting
“on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be
found thereon . . . and peace subsists . . . on the borders of the hunting
districts.” 78 The Court noted that the Wyoming Statehood Act made no
mention of Indian treaty rights and provided no clue that Congress
considered the Tribe’s rights and decided to abrogate them when
enacting the law. 79 As the Court put it, “[t]here simply is no evidence
that Congress intended to abrogate the 1868 Treaty right through the
Wyoming Statehood Act, much less the ‘clear evidence’ this Court’s
precedent requires.” 80 In other words, the Court again performed a
straightforward application of the Dion test.
On the treaty interpretation matter, the issue was whether the
Crow Tribe, at the time of signing the treaty, understood the 1868 treaty
to expire at statehood. 81 Taking the position that a treaty is a contract
between two sovereign nations, the Court stated that Indian treaties
“‘must be interpreted in light of the parties’ intentions, with any
ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians’ 82 . . . and the words of a
treaty must be construed ‘in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.’” 83 The Court concluded that there was
nothing in the text of the 1868 Treaty with the Crow Tribe that even
suggested that the parties intended the hunting right to expire at
statehood. 84
Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den was another 54 decision, this one involving a matter of treaty interpretation. 85 The
issue was whether the State could impose on Cougar Den, a Yakama
tribal entity, a fuel tax levied and imposed upon motor vehicle fuel
75. Id. at 202–03 (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986)).
76. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct 1686 (2019).
77. Id. at 1691–92.
78. Treaty Between the United States and the Crow Tribe of Indians, Crow-U.S., art. 6, May
7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, 650; 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 348, 381.
79. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1698.
80. Id. at 1698–99.
81. Id. at 1699–1700.
82. Id. at 1699 (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 206
(1999)).
83. Id. at 1699 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443
U.S. 658, 676 (1979), modified sub nom. Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979)).
84. Id.
85. Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).
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licensees for each gallon of fuel that the licensee brings into the State. 86
Cougar Den argued that the state fuel tax was preempted by a clause in
the Yakama Treaty of 1855 that reserved for tribal members “the right,
in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public
highways.”87
In upholding Cougar Den’s claim, Justice Gorsuch, in concurrence,
followed the Indian canons of treaty interpretation, stating “[w]hen
we’re dealing with a tribal treaty, too, we must ‘give effect to the terms
as the Indians themselves would have understood them.’” 88 Gorsuch
then gave his reasons for applying the canon, noting that it was the
United States who wrote this “contract,” and any ambiguities in
contracts are usually construed against the drafter. 89
There was one unusual case decided in 2001 that fell in between
treaty and statutory interpretation. The issue in Idaho v. United States
was whether the United States intended the land underneath Lake
Coeur d’Alene to transfer to the State of Idaho upon statehood.90
Pursuant to former “agreements” with the Lac Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the
lake was originally included as part of the tribal reservation. 91 Because
the case involved land underneath navigable waters, which are
presumed to transfer to the state upon statehood, slightly different
rules of interpretation applied. 92 Thus, the Court in this 5-4 decision
never mentioned any canons in favor of Indians or brought in rules of
treaty interpretation and instead found:
The issue of congressional intent is refined somewhat when
submerged lands are located within a tract that the National
Government has dealt with in some special way before
statehood, as by reserving lands for a particular national
purpose such as a wildlife refuge or, as here, an Indian
reservation. Because reserving submerged lands does not
necessarily imply the intent “to defeat a future State’s title to the
land,” we undertake a two-step enquiry in reservation cases. We
ask whether Congress intended to include land under navigable
waters within the federal reservation and, if so, whether
86. Id. at 1006.
87. Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, Yakima-U.S., June
9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, 953.
88. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1116 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
89. Id. Gorsuch also mentioned: “Nor is there any question that the government employed
that power to its advantage in this case. During the negotiations ‘English words were translated
into Chinook jargon . . . although that was not the primary language’ of the Tribe. After the parties
reached agreement, the U.S. negotiators wrote the treaty in English—a language that the Yakamas
couldn’t read or write.” Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
90. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 278–81 (2001).
91. Id. at 266.
92. Id. at 273–74.
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Congress intended to defeat the future State’s title to the
submerged lands. 93
In the end, the Court found that Congress never intended to modify the
agreement negotiated with the Tribe, stating that “[a]ny imputation to
Congress either of bad faith or of secrecy in dropping its express
objective of consensual dealing with the Tribe is at odds with the
evidence.” 94
Except for Bourland, the tribes won all these treaty or quasi-treaty
cases, and the Court faithfully applied the appropriate canons. This was
not always true for the types of cases analyzed in the next Subsection of
this Article.
2. The Reservation Disestablishment Cases: Treaty Abrogation Cases or
Something Else?
The following cases ask whether subsequent legislation enacted
pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1884, 95 and allowing nonIndians to purchase “surplus” land within an allotted Indian
reservation, 96 disestablished the borders of the reservations at issue.97
There have been four of these cases since 1987: Hagen v. Utah, 98 South
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 99 Nebraska v. Parker, 100 and McGirt v.
Oklahoma. 101 Officially, all four cases applied the test the Court
established in Solem v. Bartlett. 102 The issue in Solem was whether South
Dakota had jurisdiction over a crime committed by a tribal member on
land within the exterior boundaries of a reservation created under a
treaty with the Cheyenne River Sioux.103 South Dakota argued that the
treaty reservation was disestablished, and therefore the State, and not

93. Id. at 280.
94. Id. at 281.
95. General Allotment Act of 1884, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
96. Under the General Allotment Act, tribal members surrendered their undivided interests
in tribally owned lands and in return received an individual allotment of a certain acreage, usually
around eighty acres, which would be held in trust by the United States for the benefit of that
individual Indian. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1, 9–10 (1995).
The goal of the Allotment policy was to transform Indians into farmers. Id. at 6–7.
97. In almost all cases, substantial tribal land remained unallotted after each tribal member
had received their allotment. See id. at 13–14. Usually, these lands were declared surplus and
opened for sale to non-Indians. Id.
98. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
99. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
100. Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016).
101. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020).
102. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
103. Id. at 465–66.
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the federal government or the tribe, had jurisdiction over the crime.104
The Court held that the reservation was not diminished, and therefore
the State had no jurisdiction. 105 The Court in Solem declared that
“[d]iminishment . . . will not be lightly inferred. Our analysis of surplus
land Acts requires that Congress clearly evince an ‘intent to change
boundaries’ before diminishment will be found.” 106
Although the Court seemed to adopt a “clear evidence of
congressional intent” test similar to the one the Court would adopt in
Dion a couple years later, 107 that was far from the reality. Under Solem, If
the words of the statute failed to demonstrate such clear intent, a court
could also look at events surrounding the passage of the Act to see if
they “unequivocally reveal a widely held contemporaneous
understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of
the proposed legislation.” 108 If “contemporaneous events” were not
enough to reveal a clear indication of congressional intent, a court
could analyze “events that occurred after the passage of a surplus land
Act to decipher congressional intent.” 109 Finally, if these “subsequent
events” did not show clear congressional intent, a court could look at
“who actually moved onto opened reservation lands” since this “is also
relevant in deciding whether a surplus land act diminished a
reservation.” 110
Among the four cases, Yankton was the only one that mentioned
Dion but did not elaborate further. 111 Nor did it follow Dion’s
methodology. In Yankton, the Yankton tribe was attempting to regulate
a solid waste disposal facility owned by a non-Indian. 112 The non-Indian
argued that the tribe did not have jurisdiction because the waste facility
was not within the reservation. 113 The Court agreed, finding that
congressional intent to diminish the part of the reservation where the
facility was located was clear from the “plain statutory language.” 114 Key
to the Court’s finding of clarity was that the legislation provided that
the Tribe shall “cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all

104. Id. at 464–65.
105. Id. at 481.
106. Id. at 470.
107. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
108. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (“Only Congress can alter the
terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation, and its intent to do so must be ‘clear and
plain.’” (citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–39 (1986))).
112. Id., 522 U.S. at 340–41.
113. Id. at 340.
114. Id. at 351.
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their claim, right, and interest to all the unallotted lands within the
limits of the reservation” for a sum of $600,000.115
In Hagen, the State of Utah was trying to prosecute an Indian for
distributing a controlled substance. 116 The Indian argued that the State
had no jurisdiction over him because the crime was committed within
the reservation. 117 The Court disagreed, finding that the part of the
reservation at issue had been disestablished. 118 Just as in Yankton, the
Court found clear indication of congressional intent because the statute
at issue used certain key words, such as having the lands relinquished
by the Tribe “restored to the public domain.” 119 The Hagen dissent
eloquently summarized the applicable law in disagreeing with the
majority’s methodology:
Two rules of construction govern our interpretation of Indian
surplus-land statutes: we must find clear and unequivocal
evidence of congressional intent to reduce reservation
boundaries, and ambiguities must be construed broadly in
favor of the Indians. . . . In diminishment cases, the rule that
“legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians”
also must be given “the broadest possible scope”. . . . Although
the majority purports to apply these canons in principle, it
ignores them in practice, resolving every ambiguity in the
statutory language, legislative history, and surrounding
circumstances in favor of the State and imputing to Congress,
where no clear evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent
to diminish the Uintah Valley Reservation. 120
Both Hagen and Yankton claimed to look for clear evidence of
congressional intent but found such clarity by arbitrarily claiming that
some “magic words” such as “cede, sell, and relinquish” or “lands
returned to the public domain” were code for “the reservation is hereby
diminished, reduced, or terminated.”
Parker and McGirt, both finding no disestablishment, could be
interpreted as moving away from the Solem methodology, although
both pretended to follow it. 121 Professor Matthew Fletcher noted that

115. Id. at 344.
116. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 408 (1994).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 421–22.
119. Id. at 414–15.
120. Id. at 422–24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. In McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), the majority opinion referred approvingly to
Solem no less than seven times. In Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016), the Court cited to Solem
when it stated that “[t]he framework we employ to determine whether an Indian reservation has
been diminished is well settled.” Id. at 487.
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Parker reflected closer fidelity to textualism by engaging only with the
text of the statutes and putting “an end to much of that nonsense” that
had been generated under the Solem extratextual methodology.122
Indeed, in Parker, Justice Thomas rejected sole reliance on extratextual
materials in federal cases, stating that while the Court could consider
such treatment, “[o]ur cases suggest that such evidence might
‘reinforc[e]’ a finding of diminishment or nondiminishment based on
the text. . . . But this Court has never relied solely on this third
consideration to find diminishment.” 123 As to the subsequent
demographic history of the reservation, Thomas concluded that it
“cannot overcome our conclusion that Congress did not intend to
diminish the reservation in 1882. And it is not our role to ‘rewrite’ the
1882 Act in light of this subsequent demographic history.” 124
McGirt v. Oklahoma continued the trend away from the Solem
methodology. 125 Justice Gorsuch for the majority reaffirmed Parker’s
position that extratextual evidence could not be conclusive when it
came to holding a reservation was disestablished, stating:
To avoid further confusion, we restate the point. There is no
need to consult extratextual sources when the meaning of a
statute’s terms is clear. Nor may extratextual sources overcome
those terms. The only role such materials can properly play is to
help “clear up . . . not create” ambiguity about a statute’s
original meaning. 126
Nor are there any past Supreme Court cases that support the State’s
position in McGirt. 127
While both Parker and McGirt can be viewed as decisions applying
textualism to the tribes’ advantage, the disestablishment cases should
have been viewed as treaty abrogation cases from the beginning, and
122. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 121–22.
123. Parker, 577 U.S. at 492 (alterations in original).
124. Id. at 493.
125. As the McGirt dissenters stated: “Today the Court does not even discuss the governing
approach reiterated throughout these precedents. The Court briefly recites the general rule that
disestablishment requires clear congressional ‘intent,’ but the Court then declines to examine the
categories of evidence that our precedents demand we consider.” McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2486–87
(internal citation omitted). For a thorough background, analysis, and discussion of the case’s
consequences, see Robert J. Miller & Torey Dolan, The Indian Law Bombshell: McGirt v. Oklahoma,
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
126. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469.
127. Id. at 2470 (“Oklahoma and the dissent have cited no case in which this Court has found a
reservation disestablished without first concluding that a statute required that result. Perhaps they
wish this case to be the first. To follow Oklahoma and the dissent down that path, though, would
only serve to allow States and courts to finish work Congress has left undone, usurp the legislative
function in the process, and treat Native American claims of statutory right as less valuable than
others.”).
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not just as statutory interpretation cases, as these cases all involve
disestablishment of treaty-created reservations. As with treaty
abrogation, statutes affecting reservation boundaries should require
clear evidence that Congress actually considered modifying the original
reservation boundaries and opted to diminish the reservation. In effect,
Parker and McGirt can be viewed as cases re-establishing Dion—instead
of Solem—as the controlling authority, with the important caveat that
both Parker and McGirt disregarded Dion’s dicta that clear evidence of
actual consideration could also be derived from legislative history and
surrounding circumstances. 128
The reason for the initial error in not considering such cases treaty
abrogation cases could be traced to the fact that although many
reservations were established by treaties, the statutes opening the
reservations to non-Indians did not “directly” abrogate treaties, because
the treaty-established borders had already been modified by other Acts
of Congress that reduced the original size of the treaty reservations.
These Acts of Congress were in turn further modified by subsequent
legislation opening up the reservations for non-Indian settlement
pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887. 129
For instance, the first two cases considering disestablishment were
non-treaty cases, in that the reservations were established by acts of
Congress and not by treaties. 130 The third case, DeCoteau v. District Court,
was different in that even though the original reservation was set up by
treaty, the Act held to disestablish the reservation was enacted to
implement an 1889 agreement with the Tribe. 131 The Court mentioned
the Indian canon under which “legal ambiguities are resolved to the
benefit of the Indians,” 132 but not the treaty abrogation canon requiring
clear evidence of actual consideration to abrogate the treaty.
The fourth case, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, also involved
amendments to the 1889 Act, 133 even though the reservation of the
Rosebud Sioux was originally established in an 1868 treaty. 134 Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, noted that the resolution of the case
hinged on congressional intent, but that such intent can be derived
from “‘the face of the Act,’ the ‘surrounding circumstances,’ and the

128. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
129. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887).
130. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 354 (1962)
(noting that the reservation was created by an Executive Order in 1872); see also Mattz v. Arnett, 412
U.S. 481, 485–87 (1973) (noting that Congress authorized the President to create the reservation by
the Act of March 3, 1853, ch. 104, 10 Stat. 238, and that the President issued his order creating the
reservation on November 16, 1855).
131. DeCoteau v. District Cnty. Ct. for the Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975).
132. Id. at 447.
133. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1977).
134. Treaty of Fort Laramie, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.3.
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‘legislative history.’” 135 Although Rehnquist found such clear evidence of
congressional intent to disestablish the reservation, the dissent
criticized the majority, noting that the Court held the reservation
disestablished “when the evidence concerning congressional intent is
palpably ambiguous.”136
In conclusion, it seems that the Solem methodology was in effect not
applied in Parker and McGirt. Both cases emphasized finding clear
evidence of congressional intent from the text of the statutes and not
from extratextual evidence.
3. Non-Treaty Cases Mentioning the Indian Ambiguity Canon
Although there are four cases mentioning the Indian ambiguity
canon, only one, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, actually applied the canon. 137 Another mentioned
it, but only for the purpose of discarding it. 138 The other two cases
involved dissenting opinions. 139
County of Yakima involved state taxation of land inside the Yakima
Indian reservation that had been initially assigned to individual Indians
during the Allotment process but was subsequently taken out of trust
status and now owned in fee simple. 140 The Court, per Justice Scalia,
held that while the General Allotment Act permitted the County to
impose an ad valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee pursuant
to the Act, it did not allow the County to enforce its excise tax on sales of
such land. 141 On that issue, the Court noted that while “taxation of land”
could be construed to include “taxation of the proceeds from sale of
land,” this was not the phrase’s “unambiguous meaning.” 142 Finding
ambiguity, the Court said that “[w]hen we are faced with these two
possible constructions, our choice between them must be dictated by a
principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes
are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.’” 143
135. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587.
136. Id. at 618.
137. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.
251, 269 (1992).
138. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 110 (1993).
139. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379
(2009).
140. Cnty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 253–54.
141. Id. at 268–70.
142. Id. at 268–269. The Court remarked that it had once before taken the position that “a tax
upon the sale of property is not a tax upon the subject matter of that sale.” Id. (citing Mahler v.
Tremper, 243 P.2d 627, 629 (1952)).
143. Cnty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 269 (alteration in original).
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The County of Yakima Court did not consider the Indian ambiguity
canon when it came to taxation of the land itself, because the Indian
General Allotment Act authorized taxation of fee-patented land, and
such taxing power was explicitly confirmed in the 1906 Burke Act which
amended the General Allotment Act. 144 The Burke Act provided that
upon issuance of the fee patent by the Secretary of the Interior, all
restrictions as to taxation of said land shall be removed. 145 Thus, the
Court found unmistakably clear expression of congressional intent to
authorize state taxation of Indian lands. 146
Justice Blackmun disagreed with that part of the majority opinion,
arguing: “To be sure, the proviso could be read to suggest that Congress
possibly intended taxation of allotted lands other than those lands
patented prematurely. But a possibility, or even a likelihood, does not
meet this Court’s demanding standard of ‘unmistakably clear’ intent.” 147
In Negonsott v. Samuels, a tribal member accused of a crime argued
that a federal law did not give the State of Kansas jurisdiction over
reservation Indians and that any ambiguity in the legislation should be
resolved in his favor. 148 The Court rejected his argument. Concerning
the Indian ambiguity canon, the Court said:
It is not entirely clear to us that the Kansas Act is a statute
“passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes.” But if it
does fall into that category. . . . We see no reason to equate
“benefit of dependent Indian tribes,” . . . with “benefit of
accused Indian criminals.” 149
The Court went on to hold that since the statute was unambiguous in
conferring Kansas jurisdiction over major offenses committed by or
against Indians on Indian reservations, this case did not call for the
application of the Indian ambiguity canon of construction. 150

144. Id. at 263–64 (“[W]hen § 5 rendered the allotted lands alienable and encumberable, it also
rendered them subject to assessment and forced sale for taxes.”).
145. See Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906).
146. Cnty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 259 (“[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals that by specifically
mentioning immunity from land taxation ‘as one of the restrictions that would be removed upon
conveyance in fee,’ Congress in the Burke Act proviso ‘manifest[ed] a clear intention to permit the
state to tax’ such Indian lands.”). For a critique of that part of Justice Scalia’s opinion, see David
Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian
Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 430–41 (1994).
147. Cnty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 272.
148. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 101, 110 (1993); see 18 U.S.C § 3243.
149. Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 110.
150. Id.
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Another case where the Court discussed the Indian ambiguity
canon was Chickasaw Nation v. United States. 151 At issue was a provision of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which stated:
The provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986]
(including . . . chapter 35 of such [Code]) concerning the
reporting and withholding of taxes . . . shall apply to Indian
gaming operations . . . in the same manner as such provisions
apply to State gaming and wagering operations. 152
The problem was that Chapter 35 did not concern itself with reporting or
withholding taxes but only imposed taxes related to gambling while
exempting certain state-controlled gambling activities. 153
The tribes argued that the Indian Gaming Act exempted them from
paying those chapter 35 taxes from which states were exempted. 154 The
Court disagreed, holding that the tribes’ treatment like states ended
with “reporting and withholding” activities. 155 Concerning the Indian
ambiguity canon, the Court stated:
The canon that assumes Congress intends its statutes to benefit
the tribes is offset by the canon that warns us against
interpreting federal statutes as providing tax exemptions
unless those exemptions are clearly expressed. Nor can one say
that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger—particularly
where the interpretation of a congressional statute rather than
an Indian treaty is at issue. 156
The dissent, authored by Justice O’Connor, agreed that the statute
contained some contradictions, but argued that since nothing in the
text or legislative history resolved the ambiguity, it was appropriate to
invoke the substantive canons of statutory construction. 157 These
canons included “the Indian canon that ‘statutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted
to their benefit.’” 158 She concluded that “because Congress has chosen
gaming as a means of enabling the Nations to achieve self-sufficiency,
the Indian canon rightly dictates that Congress should be presumed to

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1).
Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 87.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96–99.
Id. at 99.
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have intended the Nations to receive more, rather than less, revenue
from this enterprise.” 159
Carcieri v. Salazar was another case where the majority purported
to find a statute to be unambiguous, 160 while the dissent stated that
the Court’s “cramped reading of a statute intended to be sweeping in
scope . . . ignores the ‘principle deeply rooted in [our] Indian
jurisprudence’ that ‘statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the
Indians.’” 161 This case is perhaps the most egregious example among
Federal Indian law cases when it comes to arbitrarily declaring that a
statute was unambiguously clear, when in fact, it was far from it. At
issue in Carcieri was whether tribes that were not under federal
jurisdiction as of 1934 could still benefit from Section 5 of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 162 which allowed the Secretary to take
land in trust for Indians or Indian tribes. 163 Section 19 of the IRA defined
“Indian” to “include all persons of Indian descent who are members of
any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 164
For over fifty years, the Department of the Interior had taken the
position that “now under federal jurisdiction” meant that the tribe had
to be under federal jurisdiction at the time the land was being
transferred in trust to the tribe. 165 The Court disagreed and held that
“now” meant as of 1934, the year the Act was enacted into law. 166 This
meant that many of today’s federally acknowledged or recognized
tribes, like the Narragansett Tribe (the applicant for a fee to trust
transfer in Carcieri), would not qualify for the land transfer because they
were not “under federal jurisdiction” as of 1934. In finding the law
unambiguous, the Court managed to avoid both the Indian ambiguity
canon of statutory construction and the Chevron doctrine under which
an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term should be
given deference and sustained as long as such interpretation is
permissible or reasonable. 167
Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court, first relied on the ordinary
meaning of the word “now.” 168 He then mentioned the context of the
159. Id. at 100 (on resolving conflicts between canons); see also Hall, supra note 41, at 561–63.
160. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 397 (2009) (“We hold that the term ‘now under Federal
jurisdiction’ in § 479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction
of the United States when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”).
161. Id. at 413–14 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
162. 25 U.S.C. § 5101.
163. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 381–82.
164. Id. at 382.
165. In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Secretary had taken this position since 1937.
See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 406–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 382–83 (majority opinion).
167. Id. at 388–92; see generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
168. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388.
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IRA and thought it very meaningful that in another section of the IRA,
Congress had used the words “now existing or established hereafter”
when referring to an Indian reservation, yet did not adopt this phrasing
in the section authorizing the Secretary to take land into trust for
Indians. 169 Finally, he mentioned one departmental letter which
indicated that the Executive Department had a different construction
of the Act at the time of enactment than it had at the time of the case. 170
The rest of this Section will explore three cases where there was no
discussion of the Indian ambiguity canon but applying the canon would
have made a difference.
4. Cases Where the Indian Ambiguity Canon Should Have Been Used
In addition to Carcieri, Justice Thomas wrote two other majority
opinions that totally ignored the Indian canons. In Cass County v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, the issue was whether the County could
tax fee land owned by tribal members within the Leech Lake Band’s
reservation. 171 The Leech Lake reservation had been allotted by the
Nelson Act of 1889. 172 That Act did not contain any language explicitly
authorizing state or local taxation of such allotted lands. Nevertheless,
Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the County
could impose the tax because Congress had made its intent to allow
such tax “unmistakably clear.” 173 Justice Thomas came to this conclusion
by interpreting precedents as endorsing the principle that whenever
Congress allows Indians to alienate their lands, it corresponds to an
explicit endorsement of state taxation of such lands. 174
One would have expected Thomas, as an avowed textualist, to
derive this “unmistakably clear” meaning from the words of the statute
or at least from its structure. Instead, his conclusion relied on two cases
that dealt with other Acts of Congress: Goudy v. Meath, a 1906 case,175
and Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, a 1993 case. 176 Justice Thomas’s
reasoning can be summarized as follows. First, Goudy held that Section
169. Id. at 389–90 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 468).
170. This 1936 letter mentioned that the term “Indian” referred to all Indians “who are
members of any recognized tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the date of the Act.” Carcieri, 555
U.S. at 390 (quoting Letter from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affs., to Superintendents (Mar. 7,
1936)).
171. Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 106 (1998).
172. See Nelson Act of 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
173. See Cass Cnty., 524 U.S. at 110–11.
174. Id. (“We have determined that Congress has manifested such an intent when it has
authorized reservation lands to be allotted in fee to individual Indians, thus making the lands
freely alienable and withdrawing them from federal protection.”).
175. Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
176. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1993).
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5 of the General Allotment Act (GAA) allowed state taxation of Indian fee
land because of its alienability. 177 Second, in Yakima, the Court held that
the GAA was amended by the Burke Act to specifically allow state
taxation. 178 Therefore, congressional intent to allow similar taxation in
the 1889 Nelson Act could be inferred by importing a purpose borrowed
from the 1906 Burke Act. 179 As one scholar noted, in his Cass County
opinion, Thomas the textualist had become Thomas the purposivist. 180
The problem with Thomas’s analysis is first, that the Yakima Court only
found unmistakable intent to allow taxation from the Burke Act. 181 That
Act is not applicable in Cass County, as the Leech Lake reservation was
allotted pursuant to the 1889 Nelson Act. 182 Second, as one federal
circuit noted, the Yakima Court actually rejected the position adopted in
Goudy that alienability automatically means taxability. 183
The last of the three Thomas opinions surveyed in this Subsection
also reflects a stubborn refusal to acknowledge ambiguities. The issue
in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government was whether the
Venetie Indian Community could tax a non-Indian entity for work done
on tribal lands. 184 The State argued that because such lands were owned
by the tribe in fee simple, they did not qualify as being in “Indian
Country” for the purpose of allowing tribal tax jurisdiction over
nonmembers. 185 The Court, through Justice Thomas, held that lands set
aside for Alaska Natives pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA) 186 could not qualify as “Indian Country”
because such lands were not set aside for a “dependent Indian

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Cass Cnty., 524 U.S. at 112–13.
Id.
See id.; Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349).
Michael Dorf, Foreword, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 n.9 (1998).
Cnty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 264.
Cass County v. Leech Lake, 524 U.S. 103, 108.
As the Sixth Circuit stated in United States ex rel. Saginaw Chippewa Tribe v. Michigan:
The defendants argue that in Goudy v. Meath when faced with a treaty similar
to the one in this case that did not explicitly permit taxation, the Supreme
Court appears to have held that alienability is tantamount to taxability. As
the Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, “[t]his proposition may be hard
to square with the requirement, recently approved by the Yakima Nation
Court, that Congress’ intent to authorize state taxation of Indians must be
unmistakably clear.” Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cty., 5 F.3d 1355, 1358
(9th Cir. 1993). We believe that this doubt by the Lummi court is superior to
its ultimate holding that alienability implies taxability. The Yakima Court
chose not to follow Goudy’s holding with respect to the taxability of treaty
lands. The Ninth Circuit improperly relied on the 1906 Goudy decision,
instead of following Yakima.
United States ex rel. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Michigan, 106 F.3d 130, 134 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Michigan v. United States, 524 U.S. 923 (1998).
184. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 525 (1998).
185. Id.
186. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1628.
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Community” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 187 The Court emphasized
that to qualify as land set aside for a dependent Indian Community
under Section 1151, such lands must be “validly set apart for the use of
the Indians as such” and “under the superntendence of the Federal
Government.” 188 In finding that these lands were not under federal
superintendence, Justice Thomas relied heavily on ANCSA’s
congressional findings, according to which “the [ANCSA] settlement
should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, . . . without
establishing any permanent racially defined institutions [and] without
creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship.” 189 As
other scholars have argued, there is nothing in ANCSA indicating that
Congress unequivocally intended that these Native fee lands not be
considered Indian Country for the purpose of Section 1151. 190 Justice
Thomas derived that intent not as much from ANCSA as from his
understanding of much older pre-ANCSA cases indicating that all lands
set aside for dependent Indian communities had historically been
under federal supervision. 191
The final case where the Indian ambiguity canon should have been
used to reach the opposite conclusion is Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.192
The major issue was whether the unmarried genetic Indian father of an
187. The term “Indian Country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 was originally codified in 1948.
However, the wording is derived primarily from the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153,
first enacted in 1885. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04(2)(c)(i)–(ii) (2019).
Section 1151 now reads:
[T]he term “Indian country,” as used in this chapter, means (a) all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same.
§ 1151.
188. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 530–32.
189. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (Congressional findings and declaration of policy); see Native Vill. of
Venetie, 522 U.S. at 532–33.
190. See David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis, and Dependent Indian
Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37, 52–53 (1999) (“[ANCSA] does not
demonstrate clear congressional intent for the Venetie Tribe’s ANCSA lands not to be ‘validly set
aside for Indians.’ As the Court recognized, Congress intended to ‘end the sort of federal
supervision over Indian affairs that had previously marked federal Indian policy.’ However, that
does not preclude land from being set aside for Indians in a manner that would reduce federal
supervision over Indian affairs.”).
191. See Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 528–30 (relying on United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28 (1913); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914); and United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535
(1938)).
192. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 649 (2013) (noting that the general purpose of
the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act was to prevent the break-up of Indian families through the
unwarranted removal of Indian children by over-zealous state social workers).
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Indian child could challenge the adoption of his child under Section 1912
(f) and (d) of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 193 Adoptive Couple
should have been a good candidate for applying the Indian ambiguity
canon. Yet, in this 5-4 decision, the majority concluded that the “plain
text of §§ 1912(f) and (d) makes clear that neither provision applies in
the present context.” 194 Section 1912(f) provides that:
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.” 195
Relying heavily on dictionary definitions of the words “continued
custody,” the Court held that Section 1912(f) did not apply because the
father in this case never had custody of the Indian child. 196 The Court
also stated that this interpretation conformed with the “primary
mischief” the Act was intended to prevent, which was “the unwarranted
removal of Indian children from Indian families due to the cultural
insensitivity and biases of social workers and state courts.” 197 The
dissent, on the other hand, accused the majority of beginning “its
analysis by plucking out of context a single phrase from the last clause
of the last subsection of the relevant provision, and then builds its
entire argument upon it.” 198 The dissent also criticized the majority for
openly professing “its aversion to Congress’ explicitly stated purpose in
enacting the statute.” 199 Justice Sotomayor concluded the dissent by
stating that the majority
asserts baldly that “when an Indian parent abandons an Indian
child prior to birth and that child has never been in the Indian
parent’s legal or physical custody, there is no ‘relationship’ that
would be ‘discontinu[ed]’ . . . by the termination of the Indian
parent’s rights.” Says who? Certainly not the statute. . . . In the
face of these broad definitions, the majority has no warrant to

193. Id. at 641; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
194. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 656.
195. Id. at 647 (quoting § 1912(f)) (emphasis added).
196. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 647–48.
197. Id. at 649. The Court also added that the legislative history of ICWA “further underscores
that the Act was primarily intended to stem the unwarranted removal of Indian children from
intact Indian families.” Id.
198. Id. at 669 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
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substitute its own policy views for Congress’ by saying that “no
‘relationship’” exists between Birth Father and Baby Girl. 200
In conclusion, since 1987, the Indian ambiguity canon of statutory
construction, calling for a liberal construction with ambiguities
resolved in the Indians’ favor, has been mentioned only once in a
majority opinion. Yet many cases, including Chickasaw, Carcieri, Cass
County, Venetie, and Adoptive Couple, should have reached contrary
results had the Court acknowledged that the statutes involved were
ambiguous and applied the Indian ambiguity canon.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE INDIAN CANONS
AND THEIR PROPER APPLICATION
In this Part, after first exploring the potential textualist objections
to the use of normative canons, I argue that these objections are not
legitimate because the Indian canons have a constitutional basis. I then
provide arguments to enhance the use of such canons and conclude by
discussing the extent of their applicability.
A. The Textualist Perspective
This Article has already mentioned how Justice Scalia’s
unwillingness to find ambiguities has posed a problem for the use of the
Indian ambiguity canon. 201 An additional issue is that the first part of
the canon calling for statutes to be “liberally” construed is bound to be
problematic for a textualist if “liberally” is understood as construing a
statute so as to give the maximum effect to the purpose of the statute. 202
Almost by definition, textualists dislike considering a statute’s
“purpose” in order to derive the meaning of a text. Yet, as Professor
John Manning noted, “although textualists find it appropriate in cases
of ambiguity to consult a statute’s apparent purpose or policy (provided,
that it is derived from sources other than legislative history), they resist

200. Id. at 675 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
201. See supra note 20.
202. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “liberal construction” as “taking a document’s deemed or
stated purpose into account when interpreting a document in addition to the actual words and phrases
used in it.” Liberal Construction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). Lawinsider.com defines liberal
construction to mean that a statute is to be given “an expansive meaning to terms and provisions within
the statute. The goal of liberal construction is to give full effect in implementing a statute’s
requirements.” Liberal Construction Definition, LAWINSIDER.COM, https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary
/liberal-construction [https://perma.cc/6VKV-UBPU] (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.900 (2021)).
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altering a statute’s clear semantic import in order to make the text more
congruent with its apparent background purpose.” 203
One theme running throughout many of the Indian canons is a
search, whether clear or unequivocal, for congressional intent. One
could think that this would pose a problem for textualists since they
allegedly oppose interpreting statutes by looking for congressional
intent. 204 Textualist scholars like John Manning, however, have taken
the position that the very concept of legislative intent is just “a
metaphor that invites interpreters to think about how to attribute a
decision to a complex, multiparty body that does not have a mental
state.” 205 Although textualists do not believe in an actual or subjective
congressional intent, they do believe in “objectified intent,” which is
“the import that a reasonable person conversant with applicable social
and linguistic conventions would attach to the enacted words.” 206 So,
the fact that the Indian canons are phrased in terms of a search for clear
or unequivocal congressional intent should not be a problem per se for
textualists. To the extent that there is a problem, it seems to come from
the Justices’ reluctance to find ambiguities in cases such as Carcieri, Cass
County, Venetie, and Adoptive Couple.
Another potential problem for textualists is the use of substantive
canons. 207 As Justice Coney Barrett stated in an article written before
she joined the Court:
Substantive canons are in significant tension with
textualism . . . insofar as their application can require a judge
to adopt something other than the most textually plausible
meaning of a statute. Textualists cannot justify the application
of substantive canons on the ground that they represent what
Congress would have wanted. . . . A judge applying a
substantive canon often exchanges the best interpretation of a
statutory provision for a merely bearable one. 208
On the other hand, Justice Coney Barrett does not object to the use of
substantive canons when there are two equally plausible

203. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 439–40 (2005).
204. See id.
205. John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1913 (2015).
206. Manning, supra note 203, at 424.
207. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 829–
30 (2017) (empirically demonstrating that textualist justices use substantive canons no more often
than their purposivist counterparts).
208. See Coney Barrett, supra note 25, at 123–24. On the other hand, some leading textualists
have acknowledged that textualists “apply sufficiently well-settled canons of construction,
including substantive canons.” Manning, supra note 203, at 436.
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interpretations. 209 Her concern is with the use of substantive canons to
allow courts to depart from the most natural interpretation of the
text. 210 Thus, she identified as a major concern for textualists the need
to find the authority for a court to adopt an interpretation that is
contrary to the faithful agent model. 211 However, Coney Barrett takes
the position that canons derived from the Constitution should be
acceptable to textualists 212 because “[t]he duty to enforce the
Constitution may empower a judge not only to invalidate congressional
actions that violate constitutional norms, but also to resist
congressional actions that threaten those norms. The Judge need not
serve exclusively as Congress’s faithful agent because she serves a
higher law.” 213 In the next Section, I argue that the Indian canons could
be viewed as constitutionally inspired canons.
B. The Indian Canons’ Constitutional Connection
What does it mean for the Indian canons to be rooted in the trust
relationship, and what does this fact imply for the canons’ application?
Here, I show that the Indian canons have a constitutional lineage
because the trust doctrine has constitutional roots. As Professor Carole
Goldberg eloquently stated:
[T]he concept of a federal trust does draw on the text of the
Constitution. . . . The textual source in the Constitution is
article I, which differentiates Indian tribes both from foreign
nations and from states. This text required the Marshall Court
to identify precisely what kind of political bodies the tribes
were; and the conclusion—that they were “domestic dependent
nations”—encompasses both the ideas of a trust and of
sovereignty. 214

209. Coney Barrett, supra note 25, at 123 (“Substantive canons are in no tension with faithful
agency insofar as they are used as tie breakers between equally plausible interpretations of a
statute. Textualists have no difficulty taking policy into account when language is ambiguous.”).
210. Id. at 110
211. Id.
212. Id. at 111 (“[T]o the extent a canon is constitutionally inspired, its application does not
necessarily conflict with the structural norms that constrain judges from engaging in broad,
equitable interpretation. Instead of pursuing undifferentiated social values—however sound and
desirable they may be—constitutionally inspired canons draw from an identifiable, closed set of
norms. As such, their effect on the legislative bargain is more predictable.”).
213. Id. at 169.
214. Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as Peoples,” 39
UCLA L. REV. 169, 179 n.54 (1991).
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The existence of a trust relationship between the United States and the
Indian nations can be traced to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 215 In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall relied
principally on three arguments to formulate his description of tribes as
“domestic, dependent nations.” 216 First, “[t]he Indian territory is
admitted to compose a part of the United States.” 217 This assertion
derives from the Court’s earlier case Johnson v. M’Intosh where the Court
held that the doctrine of discovery applied to Indian nations. 218 Second,
“[t]hey acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the
protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall
have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and
managing all their affairs as they think proper.” 219 Finally, the Chief
Justice mentioned that the Commerce Clause, which empowers
Congress to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes,” makes a distinction between
foreign nations and Indian tribes because “[i]n this clause they are as
clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to themselves, from
foreign nations, as from the several states composing the union. They
are designated by a distinct appellation.” 220
As explained earlier, the trust doctrine was used to justify the
congressional plenary power over Indian nations. 221 In more modern
times, however, the source of congressional power over Indian tribes
has migrated from the trust doctrine to the Constitution. 222 Thus, while
comparing the Interstate Commerce Clause with the Indian Commerce
Clause, the Court mentioned that “while the Interstate Commerce
Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade among the
States . . . the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to
215. See supra text accompanying note 53.
216. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831).
217. Id. at 12.
218. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 592 (1823) (interpreting and applying the doctrine of
discovery, the Court held that the United States acquired “ultimate” title to the lands of Indian
nations); see ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED 166 (2006) (tracing
the roots of the trust relationship to the doctrine of discovery).
219. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 12. Scholar Mary Christina Wood agreed that the treaties are at
the origin of the trust relationship but took the position that the trust relationship comes more
from the huge transfer of land from the tribes to the United States that was made through those
treaties. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471.
220. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 13, 18 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
221. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 231–32. Scholars have long debated the legitimacy and extent of the “plenary
power” of Congress over Indian Affairs. See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce
Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1082–88 (2015); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 45, 73–94 (2012); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L.
REV. 121, 132–33 (2006); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 228–36 (1984); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 113 (2002).
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provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs.” 223 However, the trust doctrine is still mentioned as a source of
congressional plenary power. For instance, in a 1974 case, although the
Court stated that “[t]he plenary power of Congress to deal with the
special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from
the Constitution itself,” 224 the Court also mentioned that Congress’s
broad powers over Indian tribes was “based on a history of treaties and
the assumption of a ‘guardian-ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of
federally recognized Indian tribes.” 225
In mentioning Indian tribes in the Commerce Clause along with
other sovereigns, the Constitution recognizes, implicitly at least, that
Indian tribes possess a certain degree of sovereignty. 226 The
Constitution does not, however, guarantee the extent of this
sovereignty, 227 and the Court has undermined tribal sovereignty by
holding that the purpose of the Commerce Clause was to give Congress
plenary power over Indian tribes. 228 In that fashion, the trust
relationship can be considered, just like federalism, an underenforced
norm with constitutional roots. 229 For instance, although Indian tribes
can sue the federal government for breach of specific statutes creating
trust duties, 230 they have generally been denied the right to sue the
223. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (noting also that U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides Congress with the power to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes”).
224. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974).
225. Id. at 551.
226. See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy,
and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal
Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 662–63 (2009) (“[A]s a textual matter the Constitution
does recognize tribal sovereignty in the Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause.”); see also
Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 641, 657–58 (2003); Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional
Status of Indian Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 321 (2003) (“The most effective protection of tribal
separateness and empowerment may be found in the acknowledgment, particularly the unclouded
judicial acknowledgment, of tribal nations as constitutionally recognized sovereigns.”).
227. See M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 TULANE L. REV. 269, 329–30 (2018)
(“Indian tribes are mentioned in the Constitution, but the scope of their rights and authorities are
notably absent.”).
228. See Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 192. For an argument tying statutory interpretation
to congressional overreach under the plenary power doctrine, see David Williams, Legitimation and
Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 415
(1994) (“[W]hile the Constitution may provide Congress with legislative authority over Indian
affairs, it leaves unanswered how such statutes are to be interpreted. To answer that question, the
Court must examine the nature, origin, and justification of Congress’ power over Indian tribes.”).
229. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 597 (“[S]tructural constitutional protections,
especially those of federalism, are underenforced constitutional norms. They are essentially
unenforceable by the Court as a direct limitation upon Congress’s power, and are best left to the
political process. But the Court may have a legitimate role in forcing the political process to pay
attention to the constitutional values at stake, and super-strong clear statement rules are a
practical way for the Court to focus legislative attention on these values.”).
230. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 226–27 (1983).
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federal government for injunctive relief directing the government to
enforce the trust responsibility. 231 Similarly, while tribes can sue the
federal government for monetary damages for taking a vested property
right without affording just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment, 232 they have not been able to successfully challenge the
power of Congress to regulate their tribal affairs or interfere with tribal
self-government. 233
In other words, while tribes can sue the United States for violations
of other parts of the Constitution, they cannot allege that Congress has
exceeded its power under the Indian Commerce Clause. Professor
Clinton once critically observed that while there are external
constitutional limits to congressional power over Indian tribes, there
are no internal limits within the Indian Commerce Clause. 234 In
conclusion, the Indian canons of statutory construction have a
constitutional lineage because the status of Indian nations as
sovereigns is implied in the Commerce Clause. However, that clause
has also been construed as giving plenary power to Congress.

231. See Curtis Berkey, Rethinking the Role of the Federal Trust Responsibility in Protecting Indian
Law and Resources, 83 DENVER L. REV. 1069, 1079 (2006) (“In the current hostile legal climate,
arguments that the trust responsibility requires federal agencies to act in the best interests of
tribes, independent of their statutory duties, are likely to be greeted with skepticism.”). Besides
Berkey, other scholars have also argued that Tribes should be able to force the government to
defend tribal trust resources. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility:
Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims for Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39
TULSA L. REV. 355, 364–68 (2003). There is, however, no final Supreme Court decision on this issue,
and scholars are still pushing arguments requiring enforcement of the trust duties. See Scott W.
Stern, Rebuilding Trust: Climate Change, Indian Communities, and a Right to Resettlement, 47 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 179 (2020).
232. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407–08 (1980); Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704, 717–18 (1981).
233. The tribal claim would be that such congressional legislation would go beyond the power
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. For recent efforts to define the extent of the Indian
Commerce Clause, see Stephen Andrews, In Defense of the Indian Commerce Clause, 9 AM. INDIAN L.J.
182, 211 (2021); see also Lorianne Toler, The Missing Indian Affairs Clause, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (2021).
Toler argues that in only mentioning a congressional power over Indian Commerce and leaving out
a congressional power over Indian Affairs, the drafters made an unintentional mistake. However,
later in the drafting process, they intentionally refused to cure this oversight. Toler, supra.
234. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal
Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 120 (1993) (“There is, of course, a considerable difference between
managing affairs with the Indian tribes, as originally contemplated by the constitutional phrase
‘commerce . . . with Indian tribes’ and managing the affairs of the Indian tribes and their members
as contemplated by the plenary power doctrine.”); see also Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own
Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979
(1981).
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C. Searching for Congressional Intent to Interfere with Tribal Sovereignty:
Review and a Proposed Test
In a recent case involving tribal sovereign immunity, after stating
that the tribal sovereign immunity canon represented a rule of
construction reflecting “an enduring principle of Indian law,” the Court
added that “[a]lthough Congress has plenary authority over tribes,
courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to
undermine Indian self-government.” 235 Similarly, in Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, the Court stated that in construing Indian-related statutes,
courts should look for “clear” indication of congressional intent before a
statute is construed to intrude on tribal sovereignty. 236 The problem
with looking for a “clear” intent to interfere with tribal self-government
is that “clear intent” seems to be in the eyes of the beholder. This Article
takes the position that the test to find an intent to interfere with tribal
sovereignty should be the same as the test requiring “unequivocal”
expression of congressional intent before tribal sovereign immunity can
be abrogated by Congress. The tribal sovereign immunity test was
phrased in this manner because the Court borrowed from cases
deciding whether state sovereign immunity had been abrogated. Thus,
in Santa Clara Pueblo, 237 the Court cited to two state sovereign immunity
cases to justify its “unequivocal expression of congressional intent” test
for abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. 238
While looking for clear indication of congressional intent may
sound the same as looking for “unequivocal” expression, as is the case
for abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity, the fact is that courts have
taken the sovereign immunity canon more seriously. 239 Under my
proposed methodology, a court interpreting a federal statute should
first ask: Is our interpretation of the statute interfering with tribal
sovereignty? If the answer is yes, the next step would be to look for
unequivocal expression that Congress intended such interference. If
the answer is no, the court should interpret the statute so as not to
interfere with such sovereign rights.

235. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014).
236. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 58–59. The two cases cited by the Court were United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976), and United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). Since Santa Clara Pueblo was decided, however,
the test to find an abrogation of state sovereign immunity has transformed itself into a stronger
“clear statement” rule. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
239. It should be noted that there is a current debate over what constitutes “unequivocal
expression” to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the context of the Bankruptcy Act. See
Michael Bevilacqua, Silent Intent? Analyzing the Congressional Intent Required to Abrogate Tribal
Sovereign Immunity, 61 B.C. L. REV. ELEC. SUPPLEMENT II-156 (2020).
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In requiring Congress to be clear when it uses its plenary power to
interfere with tribes’ sovereign rights, the Indian canons fulfill a similar
role to the federalist canons in that those canons also aim to make sure
that Congress clearly intends to interfere with state sovereignty. 240 In
United States v. Bond, the Court stated that “it is incumbent upon the
federal courts to be certain of Congress’s intent before finding that
federal law overrides ‘the usual constitutional balance of federal and
state powers.’” 241 As explained by Professor Manning, federalist canons
preserve this balance “by presuming that, absent a clear statement to
the contrary, acts of Congress do not intrude upon the states either by
regulating state functions or displacing state law.” 242 The Indian canons
play a similar role in ensuring that tribal rights are protected from
congressional plenary power until there is a clear and manifest
congressional intent to interfere with such rights. 243 This Article’s
proposed canon protecting tribal sovereignty attempts to protect
underenforced norms such as tribal self-government and the trust
relationship by ensuring that even though the Court declared that
Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes, this power is only
enforced sparingly and willfully.
To justify the proposed analogy to the federalist canons, the tribal
sovereignty canon should apply only when federal statutes interfere
with tribal sovereignty. The question, therefore, is what kind of statutes
are those? The Indian Civil Rights Act, 244 at issue in Santa Clara v.
Martinez, 245 provides a good example of such a statute since it imposes
on tribal governments the duty to protect rights similar to those in the
Bill of Rights. 246
One test attempting to define what kind of government actions
infringe on tribal sovereignty was initially devised by the Court with

240. On Federalist canons, see John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 399 (2010). For a list of these Federalist canons, see supra note 26.
241. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014).
242. Manning, supra note 240, at 407–08 (citing to Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460, for the proposition
that “if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.”).
243. See Hall, supra note 41, at 541–42; Philip P. Frickey, Doctrines, Context, Institutional Relationships,
and Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV 5, 29
(2002). Since Congress controlled Indian affairs, “the Court’s role was simply to insure that
preexisting tribal rights were not lost through inadvertent actions by Congress or by the tribes
themselves.” Frickey, supra.
244. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201–203, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303).
245. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
246. For more background on the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, see generally ICRA
Reconsidered: New Interpretations of Familiar Rights, 129 HARV L. REV. 1709 (2016), and Mark D. Rosen,
Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L REV. 479 (2000).
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respect to states’ attempts to extend their jurisdiction in Indian
Country. Thus, in 1959, the Court in Williams v. Lee formulated a test for
deciding the extent of state jurisdiction in Indian Country, stating:
“Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state actions infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”247
The problem with borrowing this test for this Article’s purpose is that
this test was soon modified in 1973 when the Court announced a new
test:
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal preemption. The modern cases thus tend to avoid
reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look
instead at the applicable treaties and statutes which define the
limits of state power. 248
Therefore, there are no examples where the Court has applied this test
except for its application in Williams v. Lee. 249 The Court in Williams held
that state jurisdiction could not be extended so as to allow a non-Indian
to sue a tribal member in a state court over a debt contracted on the
reservation because this would “undermine the authority of tribal
courts over Reservation Affairs and hence would infringe on the right of
the Indians to govern themselves.” 250
One could also borrow from the area of the law attempting to
determine if a federal law of general applicability not mentioning
Indian tribes should nevertheless be enforced on Indian reservations. 251
There is no controlling Supreme Court precedent on this issue. 252 Under
the majority view, established by the Ninth Circuit, there is a
presumption that general federal regulatory laws apply to Indian

247. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
248. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). In White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), the Court clarified that it was adopting a balancing-of-theinterest test, holding that the Indian preemption inquiry is
not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal
sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate
federal law.
Id. at 145; see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983).
249. See Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
250. Id. at 223.
251. For a comprehensive summary of the law in this area, see generally Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 22 WASH. &
LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 123 (2016).
252. See id. at 125.
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reservations. 253 This presumption can be rebutted, however, if applying
the law would interfere with “exclusive rights of self-governance in
purely intramural matters,” or interfere with treaty rights. 254 If the
presumption is rebutted, courts following this approach have required
clear evidence of congressional intent to apply the law to the tribes. 255
Another approach, favored by the D.C. Circuit, would require only clear
evidence of congressional intent if the general federal law interfered
with the “traditional attributes of self-government.” 256 This Article
argues that when determining whether the Indian canons should apply
to a federal statute, a more generous definition of tribal selfgovernment, as was adopted in Williams and Pueblo of San Juan, should
be used. While there are some judicially imposed limits on tribal
jurisdiction over non-members, 257 the Court has never restricted tribal
sovereignty to traditional attributes of sovereignty, let alone to purely
intramural aspects of self-government. 258
In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with an
approach focusing on whether the general federal law interfered with
strictly intramural aspects of tribal sovereignty. 259 The Tenth Circuit
viewed the central question as whether Congress, in enacting such laws
of general applicability, had the intent to preempt tribal sovereign
powers in the area covered by the general federal law at issue. 260 After
stating that “in addition to broad authority over intramural matters
such as membership, tribes retain sovereign authority to regulate
economic activity within their own territory,” 261 the Pueblo of San Juan
court concluded that “[p]reempting tribal laws divests tribes of their
retained sovereign authority. . . . In the absence of clear evidence of
congressional intent, therefore, federal law will not be read as stripping
tribes of their retained sovereign authority to pass right-to-work laws
and be governed by them.” 262
253. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
254. Id.
255. See Skibine, supra note 251, at 126 (explaining that this approach has been followed in the
Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits).
256. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
257. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam.
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327–28 (2008).
258. See Skibine, supra note 251, at 137–38.
259. N.L.R.B. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2002) (“In addition to
broad authority over intramural matters such as membership, tribes retain sovereign authority to
regulate economic activity within their own territory.”).
260. Id. at 1191.
261. Id. at 1192–93.
262. Id. at 1195. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit also raised the “ambiguity” canon, stating that
“ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with tribal notions
of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence,” and reiterating
that “a well-established canon of Indian law is that doubtful expressions of legislative intent must
be resolved in favor of the Indians.” Id. at 1190–91.
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The Tenth Circuit also announced that the burden to show such
intent was on the federal agency, not the Pueblo, 263 and went on to
explain why the burden to show a congressional intent to preempt tribal
sovereignty fell on the federal agency. 264 First, the court asserted that
although Congress can divest tribal powers, divestiture was disfavored
as a matter of national policy. 265 The court then mentioned that
whenever tribal sovereignty was at stake, the trust relationship
cautioned that “we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of
legislative intent.” 266 Finally, the court invoked the federal policy of
encouraging tribal self-government. 267
The final Section of this Article addresses the kinds of statutes
where the Indian canons should apply.
D. The Extent of the Indian Canons’ Applicability
There have been five Indian statutory interpretation cases before
the Court since 1987 that did not involve Indian-specific statutes. 268 The
tribal interests lost all five, and the Court did not apply any of the
Indian canons. 269 For some, the Indian canons are applicable only to
statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians. As stated earlier, the Court
in Negonsott v. Samuels said that “[i]t is not entirely clear to us that the
Kansas Act is a statute ‘passed for the benefit of dependent Indian
tribes.’” 270 The question this Section addresses is how courts should
determine the applicability of an Indian canon.

263. Id. at 1192 (“The burden to show such congressional intent to divest the Pueblo of its
power to enact its right-to-work ordinance and to enter into the lease agreement rests upon the
Union and the NLRB.”).
264. Id. at 1194–95.
265. Id. at 1194 (“[D]ivestiture is disfavored as a matter of national policy, and will only be
found where Congress has manifested its clear and unambiguous intent to restrict tribal sovereign
authority.”).
266. Id. at 1195 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
267. Id. (“[B]oth the legislative and executive branches have declared that federal Indian policy
favors tribal self-government. On this point the Supreme Court has spoken clearly and
emphatically.”).
268. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012); Inyo Cty. v. PaiuteShoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003); El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999); Amoco
Prod. v. S. Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999); Amoco Prod. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
269. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) (interpreting the
Quiet Title Act); Inyo City v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003) (interpreting who is a
“person” under Section 1983); El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999) (interpreting the
Price Anderson Act); Amoco Prod. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999) (interpreting the Coal
Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910); Amoco Prod. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987) (interpreting the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)).
270. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 110 (1993). The Court refused to apply the Indian canon
because it found the Kansas Act was clear in giving Kansas jurisdiction over the crime. See also 18
U.S.C § 3243.
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There is arguably a difference between applying the Indian
ambiguity canon to all statutes and applying the canon when the statute
interferes with tribal sovereignty such that the tribal sovereignty canon
also comes into play. The ambiguity canon can be traced to the treaties,
but it was first applied to interpret statutes enacted pursuant to the
trust relationship. 271 The question here is whether the test should focus,
as the Negonsott Court indicated, on whether a statute was enacted for
the “benefit of tribes.” 272 This Article takes the position that this
determination would be too subjective. Determining whether some
statute was enacted “for the benefit” of the Indians could be
problematic. Take the GAA of 1887 for instance. 273 Just about all Indian
tribes were against the policy of allotment and thought the GAA would
be detrimental to Indian tribes. 274 Yet, many white politicians of the
time argued that the Act was being enacted for the benefit of Indians
because its goal was to transform Indians into farmers so that they
could more quickly assimilate into the non-Indian mainstream
society. 275
Rather than determining whether the statute actually “benefits” the
Indians or the tribes, the canon should be extended to all statutes that
were enacted pursuant to Congress’s Indian Commerce Clause power.
As noted earlier in this Article, the ambiguity canon has historically
been tied to the trust relationship.276 It is therefore rational to assume
that in cases containing ambiguities, Congress would have wanted the
statute to be interpreted to the benefit of Indians.
The tribal sovereignty canon should not be limited to statutes
enacted solely pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause power. Take,
for instance, federal laws of general applicability. These laws were not
enacted with the Indian Commerce Clause power in mind but pursuant
to other constitutional provisions, such as the Interstate Commerce
Clause power. 277 Yet, application of such laws to Indian tribes may still
interfere with tribal self-government or, in other words, with “the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 278
Both the tribal sovereignty canon—a canon that asks whether there is a
clear or unequivocal expression of congressional intent to interfere with

271. See supra notes 33–43 and accompanying text.
272. Negonsott, 507 U.S. 99, 110 (1993) (quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 392 (1976)).
273. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
274. See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property, Rights, and the Myth of Common
Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1603–08 (2001).
275. See Royster, supra note 96, at 8–9.
276. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
277. On the breadth of the Commerce Power generally, see Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (2010).
278. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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tribal sovereign rights—and the Indian ambiguity canon should apply
to such statutes of general applicability. 279
The Supreme Court expounded that “[a]mbiguities in federal law
have been construed generously in order to comport with these
traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of
encouraging tribal independence.” 280 The tribal sovereignty canon is
based on Congress’s relatively unchecked plenary power over Indian
nations. 281 Congress can exercise this plenary power not only under the
Indian Commerce Clause but also pursuant to other powers granted to
Congress under the Constitution. 282 The normative reason for the tribal
sovereignty canon is to ensure that in using its plenary power, Congress
has willfully and intentionally decided to abrogate tribal sovereign
rights. 283 It therefore does not matter whether Congress was acting
pursuant to its Indian Commerce Clause power or other more general
constitutional power. Thus, several courts have applied the Indian
ambiguity canon along with the tribal sovereignty canon to federal laws
of general applicability. 284
CONCLUSION
Through an analysis of treaty and statutory interpretation cases
decided in the last thirty-five years, this Article shows that the Court is
generally inclined to apply the Indian canons of construction to treaty
interpretation and treaty abrogation cases and cases involving
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. However, the Court is much
less willing to apply the tribal sovereignty canon, calling for clear
legislative intent before a statute is construed to interfere with tribal
sovereignty. Similarly, the Court almost never relies on the Indian
ambiguity canon, requiring statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians

279. Other scholars have also endorsed the view that the Indian canons should be applicable
beyond laws enacted strictly to regulate or protect Indians. See, e.g., Bryan H. Widenthal, Federal
Labor Laws, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 434–52 (2012).
280. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980).
281. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
282. For information regarding other parts of the Constitution giving Congress power over
Indian nations, see generally Ablavsky, supra note 222.
283. See Frickey, supra note 30; supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.
284. See N.L.R.B. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002); supra text
accompanying note 189; Buchwald Cap. Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC), 917 F.3d 451, 463 (6th Cir. 2019) (considering whether the
Bankruptcy Code had abrogated the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes in light of section 11
U.S.C § 101(27) abrogating sovereign immunity to “governmental unit”), cert. dismissed sub nom., 140
S. Ct. 2638 (2020); Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2016)
(considering whether the Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act (FACTA) had abrogated tribal
sovereign immunity).
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to be liberally construed with ambiguities resolved to the benefit of the
Indians.
This Article argues that these canons have constitutional roots, and
as such, textualist jurists should not be reluctant to use them.
Furthermore, textualism as a methodology could be helpful to tribal
interests in that congressional intent to abrogate tribal rights should be
derived from only the text of the statute and not extratextual material.
This Article also argues that the tribal sovereignty canon has been
underused. To remedy this problem, the Article suggests that the
“unequivocal expression of congressional intent” test that has been
applied to abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity should also be
applied to cases involving interference with other tribal sovereign
rights. Therefore, this Article argues that a court interpreting a federal
statute should first ask whether a certain interpretation of the statute
interferes with tribal sovereignty. If the answer is yes, the court should
look for unequivocal expression of congressional intent to interfere
with that sovereignty. Finding no such intent, a court should interpret
the statute so as not to interfere with tribal sovereign rights.

